
U.S. Department of Homeland Security 20 Mass. Ave., N.W., Rm. A3042 Washington, DC 20529





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FILE:

Office: LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA

Α

BEC 3 0 2004

IN RE:

APPLICATION:

Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under § 212(i) of the

Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

Robert P. Wiemann, Director Administrative Appeals Office

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identifying data deleted to prevent clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy **DISCUSSION**: The waiver application was denied by the Interim District Director, Los Angeles, California and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of the Philippines who was found to be inadmissible to the United States under § 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), for having procured entry into the United States by fraud or willful misrepresentation. The applicant is married to a naturalized U.S. citizen and seeks a waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to § 212(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i), in order to reside in the United States with her U.S. citizen spouse.

The interim district director concluded that the applicant had failed to establish that extreme hardship would be imposed on the applicant's wife and denied the Application for Waiver of Grounds of Excludability (Form I-601) accordingly. On appeal, counsel contends that the Immigration and Naturalization Service, now Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS), did not have the opportunity to consider all the psychological and medical documentation regarding the applicant's wife. Counsel maintains that the applicant has established that his wife would suffer extreme hardship should he be removed.

In support of these assertions, counsel submits, in part, a brief, two letters from a physician treating the applicant's wife, dated October 24 and November 6, 2003, and a report prepared by a social worker after one visit with the applicant's wife. The entire record was reviewed and considered in rendering this decision.

Section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act provides, in pertinent part, that:

(i) Any alien who, by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure (or has sought to procure or has procured) a visa, other documentation, or admission into the United States or other benefit provided under this Act is inadmissible.

Section 212(i) of the Act provides that:

(1) The Attorney General [now the Secretary of Homeland Security (Secretary)] may, in the discretion of the Attorney General [Secretary], waive the application of clause (i) of subsection (a)(6)(C) in the case of an alien who is the spouse, son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General [Secretary] that the refusal of admission to the United States of such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such an alien.

The record reflects that the applicant utilized a Filipino passport with an assumed name in order to enter the United States on August 28, 1993 at Los Angeles International Airport.

A § 212(i) waiver of the bar to admission resulting from violation of section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act is dependent first upon a showing that the bar imposes an extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of the applicant. Hardship the alien himself experiences upon deportation is irrelevant to § 212(i) waiver proceedings; the only relevant hardship in the present case is hardship suffered by the applicant's wife. Once extreme hardship is established, it is but one favorable factor to be considered in the

determination of whether the Secretary should exercise discretion. See Matter of Mendez, 21 I&N Dec. 296 (BIA 1996).

Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez, 22 I&N Dec. 560, 565-566 (BIA 1999) provides a list of factors the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) deems relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship pursuant to § 212(i) of the Act. These factors include the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative's family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate.

Counsel contends that the applicant's spouse would suffer extreme hardship if she returns to the Philippines, her native country, to live with her husband, as her parents, who are described as elderly and requiring her assistance, reside in the United States. The evidence on the record does not demonstrate that the applicant's wife, who works full time, is currently caring for her parents, or that she is the only person available to care for them. Counsel asserts that the applicant's wife would not be able to survive in the Philippines with her many health problems and without the assistance of her therapist to treat her psychological problems. The record contains no evidence that the applicant's wife is currently undergoing any psychological or psychiatric therapy, nor was any recommended by the social worker who interviewed her on one occasion, at the request of her attorney. Her health problems apparently consist of depression and anxiety, which affected her pregnancy, and carpal tunnel syndrome, stemming from her work as a computer operator. According to the treating physician, the applicant's wife's due date was March 1, 2004. The AAO must assume that she is no longer pregnant, and there is no evidence that carpal tunnel syndrome cannot be treated in the Philippines. The record does not establish that the applicant's wife would experience extreme hardship should she choose to relocate to the Philippines.

Counsel also asserts that the applicant's wife would experience extreme hardship if she remains in the United States, because of the effect her depression is having on her pregnancy. As noted above, the applicant's wife has apparently given birth; thus, she is no longer suffering from a difficult pregnancy. The AAO recognizes that the applicant's wife would suffer as a result of separation from the applicant. However, her situation, if she remains in the United States, is typical to individuals separated as a result of deportation or exclusion and does not rise to the level of extreme hardship based on the record.

U.S. court decisions have repeatedly held that the common results of deportation or exclusion are insufficient to prove extreme hardship. See Hassan v. INS, 927 F.2d 465, 468 (9th Cir. 1991). For example, Matter of Pilch, 21 I&N Dec. 627 (BIA 1996), held that emotional hardship caused by severing family and community ties is a common result of deportation and does not constitute extreme hardship. In addition, Perez v. INS, 96 F.3d 390 (9th Cir. 1996), held that the common results of deportation are insufficient to prove extreme hardship and defined extreme hardship as hardship that was unusual or beyond that which would normally be expected upon deportation. Hassan v. INS, supra, held further that the uprooting of family and separation from friends does not necessarily amount to extreme hardship but rather represents the type of inconvenience and hardship experienced by the families of most aliens being deported.

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A review of the documentation in the record fails to establish the existence of extreme hardship to the applicant's spouse caused by the applicant's inadmissibility to the United States. Having found the applicant statutorily ineligible for relief, no purpose would be served in discussing whether she merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under § 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. See Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.